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Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(c) and Ut. R. App. P. 3(a) provide this Court's
jurisdiction over this consolidated appeal from the Minutes, Findings, and Order, entered on
August 23, 2006 (the "First Order") and the Minutes and Order entered on October 27,
2006 (the "Second Order"), by the Seventh District Juvenile Court in and for San Juan
County, State of Utah, inthis case involving a second-degree felony conviction from a court
of record.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT OF
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE I: Did the trial court err under UT. R. CRIM. P. 12(e) in entertaining the
evidence surrounding Hawkins' suppression motion simultaneous to the
evidence presented as to the underlying charge?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: ". . .[T]he proper interpretation of a rule ofprocedure
is aquestion oflaw, and the appellate court reviews the trial court's decision for correctness."
State v. McNearnev. 2005 UT App 133, «8, 110 P.3d 183.
ISSUE II: Was the evidence sufficient to justify denial of Hawkins' suppression
motion?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "An appellate court reviews the factual findings
underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence using a
clearly erroneous standard; however, anappellate court reviews the trial court's conclusions
of law based onthese findings for correctness, witha measure ofdiscretion given to thetrial
judge's application ofthe legal standard to the facts." State v. Alverez. 2005, 111 P.3d 808,
522 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 2005 UT App 145, certiorari granted 124 P.3d 634.
ISSUE III: Was the evidence sufficient tosupport a conviction on the charges ofa
terroristic threat?
STANDARD OF REVIEW The standard ofreview for a sufficiency ofthe evidence
claim "ishighly deferential to ajury verdict." State v. Workman. 2005 UT 66,1j 29, 122 P.3d
639. "[This Court] begin[s] by reviewing 'the evidence and all inferences which may be
reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to theverdict.'" Id. (citations omitted).
"[This Court] will reverse ajuryverdict forinsufficient evidence only if [it] determine[s] that
'reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict.'" Id. (citations omitted). Stated another
way, "|ihis Court] will reverse a jury verdict only when, after viewing the evidence and all
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, [itj fmd[s] that the
evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing
as to irake the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." State v. Lopez, 2001 UT App 123,1
10, 24P.3d993.
ISSUE IV: Did the trial court err violate L.R.H. 's constitutional rights byfinding
him guilty on a standard below beyond a reasonable doubt?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Constitutional issues, including that of due process,
are questions oflaw which [this Court] rcview[s] for correctness." InreCannatella, 2006 UT
App 89, 132 P.3d 684, 547, citing In re KM.. 965 P.2d 576, 578 (Utah Ct.App.1998).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A. United States Const. Amends. V, VI and XIV
B. Utah Const. Art. I, §7 and 12
C Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107
D. Ut.R.Crim.P. 12(e)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 16, 2006, L.R.H., a male juvenile, was charged by Petition with making a
terroristic threat, a second-degree felony inthe Seventh District Juvenile Court, in San Juan
County, State of Utah. R0010-R0011. An Amended Petition was filed on June 9, 2006.
R0027-R0028. On May 30, 2006, a hearing was held before Judge Mary Manley of the
SeventhDistrict Juvenile Court and L.R.H. was removed from detention and placed onhouse
arrest. R0019. On June 27, 2006, a subsequent hearing was held before Judge Manley at
which time deadlines for discovery and pre-trial motions were set. All motions were to be
filed by July 18, 2006, responses within ten (10) days and replys within five (5) days. R0050.
Although it is not specifically set forth in the Minutes and Order, Judge Manley verbally
ordered that the these time periods included holidays and weekends. R0143. On July 28,
2006, trial counsel for LR.H. filed the Motion to Suppress Evidence. R0055. The State
failed to timely file their Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Suppress Evidence, filing
it on August 4, 2006, which was past the deadline set by Judge Manley's order. R0097.
On August 18, 2006, the matter came for both a hearing on the suppression motion
and for trial on the underlying charge. Honorable Mar)' Manley determined at the onset of
the hearing that she would hear the two matters simultaneously, but bifurcate her decision
as to each of them. R0167. During the process of the trial, L.R.H.'s trial counsel objected
to the prosecutor's leading of the witness on direct examination ofthe fifth of six ofthe
prosecutor's witnesses. R0198 at p. 98. The objection was sustained, with an
acknowledgment by the trial court that the prosecutor had ". . .led the entire day. . ." Id.
During the prosecutor's closing statements, as the prosecutor was arguing the
elements of the crime charged, the trial court interrupted and questioned the prosecutor as
follows;
Well, and let me stop you there, cause this is I think that the best argument is
that he intended to - intended to intimidate a civilian population. I think that
youahve to - for prong two, you have to show that his intent was to cause an
action by an official, ah, or volunteer agency organized to deal with
emergencies; that when he said this, his intent was to really, ah, law
enforcement and otherpeople. But the timethat I think that you have a break
is that - that - that it seems to me - and 1 - and I want to hear what you have
to say about this - that the response by these agencies to Field Day and, ah,
putting inmore support inplace, really - and/ 'm not entirely convinced ofthis,
so I want to hear what you have to say. But really came as a result of the
interview with him, looking in his backpack, hearing what he had to say about
'I think about this all of the time", ah, and that that - that wasn't public
information. So that wasn't something that was - that was, ah, put out there
in a way that other people would respond to it. It came as a result of that
questioning. And they responded, and I think they responded appropriately.
i\h, but do you see what I'm saying, with regard to that?
R0198 at pp. 249-250 (emphasis added). At the conclusion of the consolidated hearing,
Judge Manley denied L.R.ITs Motion to Suppress and then found L.R.H. guilty of making
a terror: sticthreat, a second-degree felony. R0167. L.R.H. was committed to detention for
a period of thirty (30) days and was to be held there pending observation and assessment,
which was not to exceed forty-five (45) days. R0170. A review hearing was scheduled for
October 17. 2006. R0171. On August 23, 2006, the trial court filed its Minutes, Findings
and Order (the "First Order") from the August 18, 2006, hearing, a copy of which is
attached hereto as Addendum k'A" and incorporated herein bythis reference. R0167-RO171.
On September 18, 2006, L.R.H. timely filed his Notice ofAppeal from the First Order.
R0175. On September 28, 2006, L.R.H. filed his Amended Notice ofAppeal. R01 78.
On October 17, 2006, the matter came for sentencing before Honorable Mary Manley
and L.R.H. was sentenced to probation based upon the findings from the observation and
assessment. R0183-R0186; R0188-R1090. On October 27, 2006, the trial court entered its
Minutes and Order (the "Second Order") from the October 17, 2006. hearing, a copy of
which is attached hereto as Addendum "B" and incorporated herein by this reference.
R0188-R1090. On November 17, 2006, L.R.H. filed his Notice ofAppeal from the Second
Order. R0195. L.R.H. filed his motion to consolidate the two appeals, which was
subsequently granted by this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 10,2006, Officer Cal Dean Black, ("Officer Black"), who is aSergeant with
the Blanding Police Department, received information regarding aplanned shooting at the
San Juan High School. R0198 at p. 11. Officer Black testified that aparent had heard from
his children that a rumor was going around the school that there was going to be ashooting
at the schools' Field Day. Id. Due to another investigation, Officer Black was unable to
begin investigating the rumors until May 11, 2006. Id.
Officer Black testified that he was the lead investigator in this matter and that he was
being assisted by Deputy J.J. Bradford ("Deputy Bradford"), the resource officer at San
Juan High School who is employed by the San Juan County Sheriffs Office. R0198 at p.
44. Upcn beginning his investigation, Officer Black learned that Deputy Bradford had also
received information about a planned shooting and had prepared two (2) search warrants.
R0198atpp. 12,14. Officer Black testified that he and Deputy Bradford served one warrant
the evening of May 11, 2006. Id. Officer Black testified that he interviewed another male
juvenile, C.G. and searched his home that evening. Id. He testified that several officers had
helped execute search warrants at C.G.'s residence on May 11, 2006. R0198 at p. 45.
Officer Black testified that he had received information that C.G. was a suspect in the
planned shooting. Id. Officer Black testified thatwhen he interviewed C.G., C.G. indicated
that he lad heard the rumors at school and was telling everyone not to come to school on
Field Day and he gave Officer Black the names of L.R.H. and some of his friends. R0198
at pp. 12-13. He also testified that no evidence was found at the home of C.G. R0198atp.
51. Officer Black also testified that a search warrant had been issued for the home ofanother
male juvenile, J.M., who was also believed to be involved. He testified that the warrant was
never executed because J.M.'s parents were out oftown on the night they planned to execute
the war-ant, and by the time they returned home they had already spoken to J.M., who gave
them ar identical story to C.G. Id. Fie also testified that no evidence had been discovered
in the C.G. residence. Id. He testified that they did not feel like they needed to execute the
warrant at J.M.'s residence when no evidence had been found at the C.G.'s residence. Id.
Officer Black testified that the next day he and Deputy Bradford interviewed or
received written statements from several otherjuvenile students, C.S., C.H., M.F., J.R., D.FL,
and L.R.H.. R0198atp. 13. All ofthe interviews ofthese individuals, except for D.H., took
place oi May 12, 2006. R0198 at pp. 43-44. Officer Black testified that J.R. and D.H.
denied any involvement in the plan and, although he had some concern about J.B., none of
the allegations against these individuals were ever established . R0198 at p. 55.
Officer Black testified that the interview of L.R.H. took place in Deputy Bradford's
Office. R0198 at p 14. Officer Black testified that Deputy Bradford's office is like most
other offices in the school, is located in the main hallway ofthe school right across from the
auditorium and is a small room about 10'xlO'. Id. Officer Black testified that Deputy
Bradford's position at theschool is todeal with problems thatcome up at theschool and that
he usually wears a polo shirt with the police badge emblem on it and not a uniform1. Id.
Officer Black testified that when L.R.H. came into Deputy Bradford's office that Officer
Black was dressed inhis police uniform. R0198atp. 16,45. Officer Black testified that, on
May 12, 2006, Deputy Bradford was wearing jeans and a t-shirt. R0198 at p. 55.
Officer Black testified that L.R.H. was sent to the office to be interviewed and that
L.R.H. was sent there by Mr. Hendry ("Hendry"), who is the Vice Principal. R0198 atpp.
15, 16. However, Officer Black testified that he was not sure if L.R.H. had been removed
from class or just called to the office by Hendry. Id. Hendry testified that he had seen
L.R.H. as he was leaving the school for lunch and that L.R.FI. did not respond when he first
called to him because he was too far away. By the time Hendry caught up toL.R.H.. he was
already to the parking lot. R0198atp. 119. L.R.H. testified that, on Friday May 12,2006,
he and J.M. were heading to the parking lot to go to his house for lunch and to then come
back for last hour. R0198 at p. 204. He testified that, when he got to his parents van that he
had driven to school, Hendry came around the building looking red faced like he had been
1 Deputy Bradford was at the school that day for purposes pertaining to a class he
teaches; otherwise he would have been in uniform. Parents of the students see him in uniform at
the school more often than not.
yelling. R0198atp. 205. Hetestified thatHendry told L.R.H. tocome there, andL.R.H. told
J.M. he would be right back. Id. He testified that IIendry took him to Deputy Bradford's
office, left him there, and closed the door. Id.
OfficerBlacktestifiedthat,uponcommencement of the interview of L.R.H.. Deputy
Bradford was seated behind his desk, L.R.H. was seated in a chair in front of the desk next
to the wall, and that he was seated in a chair in front of the desk in another chair duringthe
interview. R0198 atp. 17,45. Upon commencement oftheinterview, Officer Black testified
that L.P..II. was asked ifhe knew why he had been called to the office. R0198 at p. 16,45.
L.R.H. indicated that he had heard the rumors going around the school about his planning
a schoo. shooting. Id. Officer Blacktestified that nextthey asked L.R.H. if he would know
why these rumors were going around the school. R0198 at p. 17, 45. L.R.H. testified he
knew why he was there, that he had heard the rumors and that Officer Black and Deputy
Bradford also told him why he was there. R0198 at p. 205. He testified he told them he was
concerned about the rumor going around that he was involved but he told them he was not
involve i in anything like that and then the interview proceeded on like that. R0198 at p. 205.
L.R.H. testified that he was probably in there at around 11:30 a.m. or 11:45 a.m. because it
was lunohtime. R0198at p. 206. He testified that he did not know how long the questioning
had gor.e on but that he assumed it would only last a few minutes and then he could go to
lunch since it was lunchtime. R0198 at p. 206. Officer Black testified that, within ten (10)
minutes of commencing the interview, he and Deputy Bradford informed L.R.FI. that other
people had accused him of planning a shooting. R0198 at pp.25, 26, 46.
Officer Black testified that neither he nor Deputy Bradford ever yelled at L.R.H.
R0198 at p. 46. Officer Black testified that he and Deputy Bradford questioned L.R.H. about
the shooting and L.R.H. told them that he and some others had not planned anything. Id.
L.R.H. told them the only thing that had been planned was to pull a prank involving
Hendry's truck on Field Day. Id. L.R.H. testified that he told them that he had no
involvement in any shooting plan and then Officer Black would raise his voice enough to
drown his out so he would listen and tell him that others had told them he was involved and
had confessed to his involvement. R0198 at p. 209. He testified that Officer Black had
raised his voice anywhere from four (4) to nine (9) times. R 0198 at p. 222. Officer Black
testified thatL.R.H.denied any involvementin a potential shooting, but that he had received
information from others regarding L.R.H. specifically speaking about a potential shooting.
R0198atp. 55.
Officer Black testified that, during the half hour they interviewed L.R.H. about the
planned shooting, L.R.H. had mostly talked about the planned prank for Field Day. R0198
at p. 19. Officer Black asked L.R.H. if he liked to hunt. R0198 at p. 19. Officer Black
testified that L.R.H. told himthatwhen he goes rabbit hunting with his friends and stuffthat
they talk about the Columbine incident and about how easy it would be to bring guns to
school and shoot people. R0198 at pp. 19, 30. Officer Black testified that L.R.H. had
admitted they talked about Columbine, but that he did not recall ever talking to anyone about
a plan for a shooting on Field Day. R0198 at pp. 19, 29.
Officer Black testified that L.R.H. reported thinking about it everyday, but then
realizes that the people he would be killing are his friends, so he stops but then thinks about
it again the next day. Id. Officer Black testified that L.R.H. had given him two other possible
scenarios for a shooting. R0198 at p. 31. Officer Black testified that L.R.H. told him that
aperson would take over the office first so they could not use the intercom, and then go from
classroom to classroom. Id. ITic second scenario was that it might be better to take over an
assembly because everyone is gathered in one room. Id. Officer Black also testified that
L.R.H. iold him that, ever since he was young, he had tried to portray the image of a bad boy
and "tr is" would make him famous, meaning the shooting. R0198 at pp. 58-59. Officer
Black a so testified that he had L.R.H. sign a piece of paper that said "I have told the truth,"
that was used in the investigation but had then been destroyed. R0198 at pp. 53-54.
Officer Black testified that he spent about a half-hour questioning L.R.H. about the
rumors of a planned shooting for Field Day before he asked-a little before 12:30 p.m. -to
search trie blackbackpack L.R.H. had withhim. R0198 atp. 56. OfficerBlacktestified that
L.R.H. agreed to lethimgothrough hisbackpack and thatthey spent about thenext hour and
a half g3ingthrough it. R0198 at pp. 37-38. L.R.H. testified that OfficerBlack had asked
him if he could search his bag about a hour to a hour and a half into the questioning. RO 198
at p. 211. Officer Black testified that ifL.R.H. had not picked up his backpack and handed
it to Ofleer Black when he asked L.R.H. if he could look in it, that he would not have had
probable cause to do search it. RO 198 at pp.22-23. L.R.H. testified he told Officer Black he
could search his bag. R0198 at p. 211. L.R.H. testified that it was not by his choice that it
took an hour and a half, that as Officer Black looked through his bag L.R.H. did not ask him
to stop or ask him if he could leave. R0198 at p. 217. L.R.H. testified that he commented
on things that Officer Black seemed interested in as he pulled them out of his backpack.
R0198 at p. 218. He testified he did not feel that by telling Officer Black what he was
looking at as he searched his backpack that he was incriminating himself in anyway. Id.
Officer Black stated he started looking through L R.H.'s backpack by picking up a
notebook and flipping through papers. R0198 at pp.22-23. Officer Black testified that, at
10
this time, he was not questioning L.R.H. about the contents of his backpack, but was just
"flipping" through things. R0198 at p. 23. Officer Black testified that, as hewent through
the backpack, L.R.H. was sitting next tohim commenting about some ofthe things inside the
notebook and backpack. R0198 at pp. 23, 37-38. Officer Black testified that L.R.H. would
point out homework assignments ordrawings that he drew. Id. Officer Black testified that
things were written backwards on several papers and that hethought this was interesting and
would take a lotof talent, but L.R.H. just commented sayingthat it was simply things hewas
writing. Id.
Officer Black testified that he told L.R.H. he was concerned about some of things he
had found in his backpack. R0198 atp. 26. Officer Black indicated that he had discovered
some drawings in red ink that were ofamountainside that said "death" and "kill" or'•blood."
Id. Officer Black testified that he asked L.R.H. what the poem was about and L.R.H. told
him that he had written it the other day and that it was about suicide. R0198 at pp. 26-27.
Officer Black testified that there several hundred drawings and a couple of sheets with
profanity. RO 198 at p. 28. Officer Black then testified that someone where around 2:00 p.m.
he completed the search ofthe backpack. R0198 at p. 39. Officer Black testified that he did
question L.R.H. alittle more after going through the backpack, but that by 2:30 p.m. he had
left to interview J.B.. R0198atp. 39.
L.R.H. testified that, towards the end ofthe questioning when Officer Black raised
questions about the drawings and poems he had written, he was concerned that this might
cause aproblem. R0198 at p. 223. He testified that he even told Officer Black he needed
help regarding some of the things he had drawn and written. R0198 at p. 224. He testified
11
that someofthose poemswere written for a languagearts class assignment. RO 198 at p. 225.
He testified that the suicide note was intended to be turned in for extra credit. Id.
Officer Black testified that after he had gone to the other room and interviewed J.B.,
that he met with Chief Halliday ("Halliday"), Deputy Bradford, and Hendry, and they all
went over the information that they had received. Id. Officer Black testified that L.R.H.
neveradmitted thathe plannedto do anything on Field Day. R0198 at p. 29. Officer Black
testified that all of the information they received regarding the planned shooting came from
other students. Id.
Officer Black testified that L.R.H. was sixteen (16) years old at the time of this
incident and that he made no efforts to contact L.R.H.'s parents because L.R.H. had told
them his parents had gone to Cedar City for the weekend. R0198atpp. 18-19. OfficerBlack
testifier that later on he was informed that Sheila Black ("Sheila") was L.R.H.'s secondary
emergency contact person and that she had come to the school. Id. Officer Black testified
that L.R.H. was not under arrest at the time of the interview, and was free to leave at any
time. Id Officer Black testified that, ifL.R.H. had said he did not want to talk to them, they
would have let him leave. Id. Officer Black testified that Deputy Bradford and he had both
separately asked L.R.H. three or more times, from lunchtime until about 2:00 p.m. during the
interview, if he needed to go and get lunch, but that L.R.H. declined and told them he was
fine. RO 198 at pp. 20-22. L.R.H. testified he was never offered lunch, he was offered a soda
pop or a drink, but not lunch. R0198 at p. 206. Officer Black testified that L.R.H. would
have been able to go to the cafeteria for lunch if he wanted-that he did not have to remain
in Deputy Bradford's office and have lunch brought to him-but L.R.H. told them that he was
alright. Id. Officer Black testified that L.R.H. had gone to the restroom around noon
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unsupervised and hadreturned, without any request to doso byOfficer Black. RO 198 atpp.
19-20, 53. L.R.H. testified he was allowed to use the restroom but that he felt just like he
was asking a teacher inclass if hecould use the restroom and that hewas expected to come
back. RO 198 atp.206. Officer Black testified that hewas inand out ofDeputy Bradford's
office, as was Deputy Bradford, and that L.R.H. was leftunattended at times. R0198 at p.
25. Officer Black testified that L.R.H. was not told to remain in the room, was not under
arrest, and was not told he was being detained when he or Deputy Bradford left the room.
Id. Officer Black indicated that, during the time L.R.H. was interviewed or at least until
school let out for the day at around 1:00 p.m., the office door was closed so that the noise in
the hallway would not disturb them. R0198 at pp. 24, 46.
L.R.H. testified that he never thought about leaving the room but he was sure they
would just pick him up again ifhe did leave. R0198 atp. 219. He testified he did not know
if the office door was locked during the questioning. Id. L.R.H. testified that, at the time
ofquestioning, he was not sick or on any medication that would impair his judgment and has
not been diagnosed with a mental illness. R0198 at p. 220.
Officer Black testified that L.R.H. was in Deputy Bradford's office from
approximately 11:45 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. R0198 at p. 124-125. Officer Black testified that
from 2:30 p.m. to 4:00 p.m., L.R.H. was just sitting in Deputy Bradford's office, unattended
with the door open and was free to leave. R0198 at pp.39-40. He further testified that when
he or Deputy Bradford would leave his office with L.R.H. in it, they would tell him they
would be back. R0198atp. 52. He testified they told L.R.H. this twice. Id.
L.R.H. testified that Officer Black was in his uniform and he sat between L.R.H. and
the door during the whole questioning. R0198 at p. 207. He testified that he never felt like
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hecouldget up and leaveif he wantedto, andthat if he did theywouldjust pickhimuplater.
R0198 atp. 207. L.R.H. testified that there were times during the questioning that Officer
Black andDeputy Bradfordwouldstepout in the hallandhe couldhearthemtalking butthat
he remained in the office. R0198 at p. 207. He testified there was a period oftime when he
was alone in the office but that Officer Black had told him he would be right back and so he
assumed he shouldstaythere because theywould have more informationforhimor hewould
be released to Black or his grandparents to go to one of their homes. R0198 at p. 208.
L.R.H. 1estified he had seen Sheila at the school and assumed she was there to work this out;
however, he did not ask that she be contacted. R0198 at p. 208. L.R.H. testified that the
door to the office was closed for the majority ofthe time. R0198 at p. 208. L.R.H. testified
that there was never a point during the interview were he felt he could just leave. R0198 at
p. 208.
L.R.H. testified that actual questioning probably went on for about four (4) hours.
R0198 at p. 210. He testified that, by the end of the questioning he was just staring at his
feet, trying to answer their questions, and that he was quite depressed, that it was "one ofthe
only times in my life where I've ever felt that low and confused." Id. He testified that he
knew his parents were out oftown until late Sunday night aind that he had told them he would
not be in any trouble while they were gone. Id L.R.H. testified there was a point were
Sheila had talked to him and asked him if he was okay, and he told her he was and then he
asked hsr if she had contacted his parents, she told him she had and then she left. R0198 at
p. 212. He testified this was probably around 2:00 p.m. Id. OfficerBlack testified
that he had finished going through L.R.H.'s backpack before Sheila arrived at the school.
R0198 at p. 56. Sheila testified that, on Friday May 12, 2006, her son J.B., came home and
told her that L.R.H. had been taken by the police for questioning around noon and he had not
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seen him since. R0198 at p. 171. Sheila testified that, because she is L.R.H.'s emergency
contact person and she knew his parents were out of town, she went to the school to see if
she could find out what was happening. RO 198 atp. 171. Sheila testified that, when she first
got to the school, she spoke to Hendry and told him that she was L.R.H.' s emergency contact
and that no one had contacted her to tell her there was a problem with L.R.H. R0198 at p.
172. She testified that Hendry then went and found Officer Black, came backand got her,
and she went and talked to Officer Black. R0198 at p. 172.
Hendry testified that Sheila came to his office right after school and inquired as to
what was happening with L.R.H., since she was his emergency contact. R0198 at pp. 113-
114. Officer Black testified that when Sheila came to the school, she was informed of the
situation. R0198 at p. 47. Hendry testified that once he had verified Sheila's information,
hetold her that L.R.H. wasbeing questioned. R0198 atpp. 113-114. Officer Black testified
that Sheila came to the school to see what was happening after her son, J.B., informed her
that they were talking to L.R.H. Id. Hendry testified that they then walked down the hall
towards Deputy Bradford's office, where Deputy Bradford and Officer Black told Sheila they
wanted to interview her son, J.B. R0198 at pp. 33, 113-114. Officer Black was not aware
Sheila was the emergency contact for L.R.H. until she came to the school. R0198 at p. 48.
He further testified that it was approximately two and halfhours from the time they began
interviewing L.R.H. before Sheila came to the school. Id.
Sheila testified that she got to the school around 2:00 p.m. and came to speak with
him. R0198atp. 172. She testified that she had spoke with Officer Black, he told her alittle
ofwhat was going on, and he asked her if she knew how to get into contact with L.R.H.'s
parents. Id. She said that Officer Black also told her that he wanted to speak with her son,
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J.B. Id. She told Officer Black that she would go and find J.B. and see ifhe would speak
with Officer Black. Id. She also testified that she went to get the phone number for L.R.H.'s
parents. Id.
Officer Eilacktestified that Sheila did not ask them to stop questioning L.R.H. or ask
that he be released to her, and he did not discuss releasing L.R.H. with Black. R0198 at pp.
32-33, '-8. Hendry testified thatBlack did not ask to have L.R.H. released to heror to that
she be allowed go into the office where L.R.F1. was located. R0198 at p. 114. Sheila
testifiec that, when she first spoke with Officer Bilack that she did not see L.R.H. RO 198 at
p. 173. Officer Black testified that, at the time Sheila arrived at the school, he was still
questioning whether they had enough evidence to hold L.R.H.. R0198 at p. 56.
He testified that Sheila told him that she would contact L.R.H.'s parents and have her
son come down so that he could be interviewed. Id. Officer Black testified that Sheila then
left and returned a while later with her son. Id. Officer Black testified that, around 2:00
p.m., he left the room with L.R.H. to interviewJ.B. and was gone approximately one to one-
and-one-halfhours interviewing J.B. and others in another room, during which time thedoor
was left open. RO 198 at pp. 24-25. Officer Black testified that he interviewed J.B., Sheila's
son, do\vn the hall in the band room at the same time L.R. H. was sitting in Deputy Bradford's
office. RO 198 at p. 34. Halliday had been present for part ofthe interview with J.B. R0198
at p. 45. Officer Black testified the Sheila did not go with her son when he was interviewed,
but instead waited in the hallway according to Hendry. R0198atpp.34,114. OfficerBlack
testifiec that he interviewed J.B. for about an hour to an hour and a half and that Sheila
expressed no concern over the length of time. R0198 at p. 36.
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Sheila's son,J.B., testified that he was interviewed regarding the school shooting on
May 12, 2006, for about an hour and ahalfby Officer Black and Halliday in the technology
room at the school. RO 198 atp. 165. He testified that both Officer Black and Halliday were
wearing uniforms. RO 198 atp. 166. J.B. testified that, although Halliday and Officer Black
never actually said they were accusing him of anything, he felt like they were. Id. J.B.
testified thathe was never read his rights. Id. He testified that his Mom, Sheila, had been
contacted by Officer Black telling her that hewould like totalk toJ.B.. Id. J.B. testified that
he went voluntarily to the school to speak to him and told Sheila that she could wait outside
while he was questioned, that he is eighteen (18) years old. Id.
Sheila testified that, in orderto obtain the number for L.R.H.'s parents, shehadto go
to Julie's son's new in-laws because she knew they would have their cell phone numbers.
Id. She testified that the in-laws gave her the cell phone numbers, and called and told them
to have Julie contact Sheila at her home when they arrived. Id. She testified that Julie
contacted her when they arrived and Sheila told Julie that L.R.H. was in some kind oftrouble
and that he was being held at the school but that she did not know what was going tohappen.
Id. Sheila testified that Julie told her they could not come home and Sheila told Julie she
would take their contact numbers and give them tothe school. R0198atp. 174. Sheila then
testified that she went back to the school and, because Officer Black was interviewing her
son, she went down the hall to Deputy Bradford's office and saw Deputy Bradford in there
along with L.R.H.. Id. She testified that when she went in the office that L.R.H. asked her
ifshe had contacted his parents, she told him she had and that everything was going to be
okay. Id. She testified that she then gave Deputy Bradford the phone number for L.R.H's
parents. Id. She testified that she told Deputy Bradford to call L.R.H's. parents when they
were finished so that she would know ifshe needed to come and pick up L.R.H. or what she
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needed to do. Id. She testified she assumed Deputy Bradford would call L.R.H.'s parents
immediately and that she had given the number to Deputy Bradford and not Hendry. R0198
at p. 175. She testified that itwas approximately 3:30 p.m. when she gave Deputy Bradford
the phone number. Id. Officer Black testified that Sheila did return with a number for
L.R.H.'s parents while hewas interviewing J.B. Id. He further testified that Sheila told him
she had called L.R.H.'s parents and informed them of the situation, but that they wanted
Officer Black to contact them when they had completed interviewing L.R.H. R0198 at
pp.34-3 5. However, Officer Black testified that this was to the best of his recollection and
he was not one hundredpercentpositivethat; he had received this message from Sheila, but
had either overheard someone say this or heard Sheila say it to someone else. Id. Hendry
testifiec that Sheila gavehim the number for L.R.H.'s parents and that he in turn gave the
number to Officer Black. R0198 at p. 127. Hendry testified that it was the opinion of
Lynette Johnson ("Johnson") whois the secondary supervisor forSanJuan School District,
that L.R.H. should not be released to Sheila. RO 198 at p. 124-125.
Officer Blacktestified that it was approximately4:00 p.m. when he discussedtaking
L.R.H. into custody with Halliday, Deputy Bradford, and Hendry. R0198 at pp.31-32, 37.
Officer Black testified that L.R.H. was never advised of his Miranda rights because he did
not believe L.R.H. was in custody at the time of the interview. R0198 at p. 52. L.R.H.
testified that he was never read his Miranda rights. R0198 at p. 212. Officer Black testified
that they had determined that L.R.H. was alone for the weekend and it was not safe to have
him home alone, so they decided to take him into custody for his own safety. R0198 at
pp.31-32, 52. Officer Black testified that he did not believe L.R.H. was in custody until 4:00
p.m., wien theytook himto the detention center; however, he still did not advise L.R.H. of
his rights at that point because he was no longer questioning him. Id.
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Officer Blacktestified that theyleft the school around4:15 p.m. to takeL.R.H. to the
detention center, at which he spent maybe half an hour filling out paperwork between 4:30
p.m. and 5:00 p.m.. R0198 at pp. 40-41. OfficerBlack testified that he believed he called
L.R.H.'s parents around 6:00 p.m. Id. Officer Black testified that between 5:00 p.m. and
6:00 p.m. hewent toL.R.H.'sresidence to retrieve a glass jar, named "theplum" that L.R.H.
told him they were planning to throw intothe back of Hendry's truck on Field Day. Id.
Officer Black testified that Sheila was at L.R.H.'s residence when he came by and he
spoke with her for a little while. Id. Officer Black testified that, while at the residence,
Sheila offered to allow Officer Black to search the residence. R0198 at p. 42. Officer Black
testified that he did not search the residence. Id. Sheila testified that she had worked with
Officer Black at the school for a long time and that she talked to him and told him that
L.R.H.'s parents were good people, but that she never intended on letting him into the
L.R.H.'s residence. R 0198 at p. 175. Officer Black testified that he went with Sheila into
the back yard and retrieved "the plum," then went back to the office. Id. Officer Black
testified that, once hereturned tohis office and spoke with hissecretary who was leaving for
the day, he then called L.R.H.'s parents. Id.
Officer Black testified that he spoke with Ed Hawkins ("Ed"), L.R.H.'s father, and
Ed told Officer Black that he had heard the rumors that may have been blown out of
proportion. R0198 at p. 43. Officer Black testified that he told Ed he did not believe
anything had been blown out ofproportion and informed Ed about the situation. Id. Officer
Black testified that Ed informed him during their phone conversation that they could not
come home until Sunday night, so they could not do anything about ituntil then. Id.
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Officer Black testified that, after the allegations had been made, the Blanding City
Police Department provided additional law enforcement atthe school on Field Day. R0198
at p. 57. He also testified that Blanding City Police Department provided extra protection
at assemblies and other school events after these allegations had been made, taking close to
forty (40) man hours. R0198 at p. 58. Hendry testified that the school had requested more
lav/ enforcement bepresent for Field Day andthat, inaddition toDeputy Bradford, they had
a State Trooper and members of the San Juan County Sheriffs Department there. Id. He
testifiec that membersofthe Blanding City Police Department were all present at Field Day
at one time or another. R0198 at p. 112. Hendry also testified that Deputy Bradford had
gone through the auditorium twice to make sure nothing dangerous was hidden there before
the final two (2) assemblies of the year. R0198 at pp. 112-113. Hendry also testified that
extra officers were also present at the assemblies. Id.
A female juvenilestudentat the school, B.H. testifiedthaton one occasion during her
fourth (4th) hour class sheheardL.R.H. eithersay to his computer or to someone nearby that
he could not wait to shoot them. ROl98 at p.64. B.H. testified that she asked L.R.H. what
he was talking about. R0198 at p. 65. She testified that L.R.H. said he would shoot her
because she was a jock, she played sports. Id. B.H. testified that her conversation with
L.R.H. 1ook place around approximately May 15,20062, which was more than aweek before
she talked to the police about it and gave them a written statement. R0198 at p. 67. B.H.'s
written statement was dated May 26, 2006. ROl98 at p.. 68. B.H. testified that she did not
take L.R.H. seriously and did not feel like it was a threat. Id.
2 It is important to note that L.R.H. was in detention as of May 12, 2006, so this may
have occurred a week or two prior to B.H.'s reporting date.
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Amale juvenile student at the school, S.W., testified thathe and L.R.H. were playing
aJames Bond computer game intheirfourth hourclass. R0198atp. 137. S.W. testified that
the game had shooting in it and that L.R.H. wanted to play, so he provided him with the
website. S.W. testified that when L.R.H. got to the website, he said to S.W., "I'm gonna to
shoot everybody." S.W. testified that the comment was about the computer game and that it
was possible, based upon their positioning, that B.H. could hear what L.R.H. was saying but
not what S.W. was saying. R0198 at p. 138. S.W. testified that he did not recall a
conversation between B.H. and L.R.H. and that L.R.H.'s statement was made in response to
the computer game and wanting to play it. ROl98 at p. 139.
Amale juvenile at the school, C.S., testified that hemade a statement tothe police on
May 12, 2006, about something he had heard in first hour shop class with Mr. Swenson,
approximately two (2) weeks earlier. R0198 at pp. 74, 78. C.S. testified that he had
overheard L.R.H. ask another male juvenile if they were still up for some plan. Id. C.S.
testified thatheoverhead someone askabout theplan, andthey stated they were planning to
do aschool shootout "[w]ith 22's." Id. C.S. testified that someone asked them ifpaint balls
would bebetter, and L.R.FI. told them paintballs would nothave the same effect. ROl98 at
p. 75. C.S. testified that someone asked them were they were going to do this and L.R.H.
said maybe Field Day or something, somewhere were everyone was in abig group. Id. C.S.
testified that L.R.H. asked him if he wanted to join in and he said "no." Id. C.S.
testifiedthat he had told J.M. about what he heard and that J.M. knew nothing about it until
heheard about it from C.S. Id. J.M. testified thathe heard about theplanon approximately
May 10, 2006. R0198 at p. 96. C.S. testified that about aweek after their conversation on
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approximately May 17, 20063, L.R.H. told him that he was onlykidding. R0198 at p.79.
C.S. tesified he believed L.R.H. when he told him he was onlyjoking. R0198 at p. 80. C.S.
testified that when he told J.M. about what he had heard, that J.M. told him they would
"chicken out" aind not go through with it. R0198 at p. 82. C.S. testified that he asked J.M.
whatwould happen if theydidgo throughwith it because he felt likeit couldbeapossibility.
R0198 at p. 83. C.S. testified that he concluded that L.R.H. might be kidding, but maybe
he would go through with it. Id.
A malejuvenile at the school, C.L. testified that he was a friend ofL.R.H. and that he
heard L.R.H. make the statement at issue in the first hour shop class. ROl98 at pp. 85-86.
C.L. testified that this conversation occurred sometime around the end ofApril, and he gave
his state ment to the police on May 12, 2006. RO 198at p. 91. C.L. testified he heard L.R.H.
say he was going to bring guns to school for a Field Day shooting and that L.R.H. made this
statement while talking to another male juvenile, D.H.. Id. C.L. testified that L.R.H. stated
he was going to use 22's, and then when C.L. told him he should use paint ball guns, L.R.H.
told him it would not be the same. R0198 at p. 88. C.L. testified that L.R.H. asked him if
he wanted to be a part of it and C.L. told him no. R0198 at p. 89. C.L. testified that he felt
like L.R .H. was making a joke and was not being serious. Id. C.L. further testified that, the
morning after this conversation, L.R.H. told C.S. that they were only kidding. R0198 at p.
91. A male juvenile student at the school, J.M., testified that C.S. also told C.G. C.G.
were talking about the plan in first hour and that someone must have found out and told the
principal or someone. R0198 at p. 96. J.M. testified that he and C.S. were called to the
office that Friday, May 12, 2006, and that they were mere all day talking about what was
3 See footnote "1" above.
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going on. Id. J.M. also testified that he had heard L.R.H. and another male juvenile, J.R.,
walking by talking about bringing guns to school orsomething like thatbutthathehad heard
it from C.S. first. R0198 at pp. 97, 101. He further testified that he had heard L.R.H. and
J.R. talking about bringing "22's" to school and that they were going to bring them onField
Day. R0198 at p. 98. J.M. testified that he overhead many kids in the hallway stating they
were not going to show up on Field Day because they had heard the rumors of the shooting.
R0198atp. 106. Hendry, the Vice Principal, testified thathe had been present when some
of the witnesses in this matter had been interviewed on May 12, 2006. R0198 at p. 110.
Hendry testified that the wimesses were brought in and told that they had heard rumors of
a shooting and then they asked them if they knew anything about it and then the witnesses
told them what they knew. Id. Hendry testified that most ofthe interviews were conducted
in his office but that two (2) of them had been conducted in Deputy Bradford's office and
that he had been presented during the interview of J.R. in that office. ROl98 at p. 111.
Hendry testified that both Deputy Bradford and Officer Black were very relaxed and did not
raise their voices when interviewing J.R. Id. Flendry testified that after J.R. was interviewed,
he was placed in Mr. Peterson's office so that he was kept separate from the others involved
so that no one could change their stories to conform with the others. R0198 at p. 117.
Hendry also testified that he was not present during L.R.H.'s interview because he was
meeting with parents ofthe other kids who were involved at the time. Id. Hendry testified
that L.R.H.'s parents were not contacted because, at the time he was contacting the other
parents whose students had been released from being questioned, L.R.H. was still being
questioned. R0198 at p. 119. Hendry testified they attempted to contact parents in this
matter as soon as it was feasible, but that because L.R.I I. was still being interviewed they did
not want to contact his parents until they knew if anything would come ofthe interview.
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R0198 iX p. 120. Hendry did testify however, that he did talk to L.R.H. for a moment when
he wasjust waiting in Deputy Bradford's officebut that hedidnot interview him. RO 198 at
p. 115.
Two other malejuvenile students, M.F. and C.H., both testified that they had given
written statements to the police that a man who worked for their boss had heard from another
juvenile L.H. and his younger brother, D.H.4, knew something abouta school shooting that
wasplanned for sometime duringthe lastweek of school. R0198 at pp. 141-148. Both boys
testified that theywere uneasyand a bit scared after hearing this statement. Id. C.H. testified
he had leard the younger brother, D.H., make a threat against Hendry after getting into
trouble :orhitting him with a snowball and that D.I I. said, "We'll wait till the end ofschool."
R0198atp. 149.
C.H.'s mother, Rachel Hatcher ("Rachel") testified that her son had told her that he
had received information regarding a possible school shooting and that, because of this
information, she caught him strapping a knife to his leg. RO 198 at pp. 153-154. C.H. testified
that he told her he had done this because he felt like he needed to protect himself from the
youngei brother, D.H. R0198 at p. 154. Hatcher testified that her husband contacted Mr.
Peterson that night and told him Rachel would come in and talk to him the next morning. Id.
Flatcher testified that she was concerned because ofthe statement the younger brother, D.H.,
had made during the snowball incident several months before that her son had overhead. Id.
Hatcher testified that when she met with Mr. Peterson, Hendry, and Deputy Bradford that
4 Although not part of the record, just for clarification purposes, these two individuals
carry the same last name as L.R.H. because they are second cousins to L.R.H. Their father is a
first couiin to L.R.H.'s father.
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they told her not to worry because they already had the culprit in custody. R0198 at p. 155.
JulieHawkins ("Julie") who is L.R.H.'s mothertestified, that theyhad told Hendry
they were going out of town on Thursday, May 11, 2006. R0198 at p. 160. Julie also
testified that, when they arrived inCedar City, herdaughter-in-law wasfrantic and informed
them that she had received a call from Sheila that L.R.H. was being questioned. Id. Julie
testified that she told Sheila to give the school the number where they could reach her and
L.R.H.'s father. Id. Julie testified that this occurred somewhere around 2:00 p.m. on May
12, 2006. Id. Julie testified that they waited a couple ofhours and around 4:00 p.m., when
they had notheard anything, they contacted theBlanding City Police Department and spoke
with Diane Bradford ("Bradford"). R0198atp. 161.
Julie testified that she did not receive any additional information from Bradford. Id.
Julie testified that school officials never contacted them that day, but that law enforcement
officials did, even though itwas not until 6:00 p.m. that evening when Officer Black phoned
them. R0198 at pp. 161-162. Julie testified that, when she gave the contact numbers to
Sheila, she did not tell her tohave them contact her as soon asthey were finished questioning
L.R.H., but rather she assumed they would do so immediately and inform them as to what
was happening. R0198 at p. 162. Julie testified that, by the time Officer Black contacted
them, they were very worried. Id. Julie testified that she had spoken to L.R.H. before they
left, that he had assured her there would be no problems and that they had reviewed the rules.
Id. She testified that they had made arrangements with Edwin Hawkins and Sheila to
supervise L.R.H. and their home while they were away. Id. Julie felt that her constitutional
rights had been violated as aparent. R198 atp. 163. Julie testified that she heard numerous
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rumors regarding a possible school shooting and L.R.H.'s involvement. Id. Julie also
testified that she gave Sheila the numbers where they could be reached and told her to take
them to the school, but she did not say that she had told her when to have them call her.
ROl98 sitp. 164.
J.B. testified that around the end ofApril, 2006, C.G. asked him if he could borrow
his .22rifle. RO 198 at p. 167. He testifiedmat he told George that he did not loanguns out
to other people. Id. He testified that C.G. asked him to borrow it on two (2) or three (3)
more occasions maybe every other day. Id. J.Bi. testified he had never spoken to L.R.H.
about a school shooting, butthattheyhaddiscussed Columbine onone(1)occasion. RO 198
at p. 163. J.B. stated that the discussion occurred after J.R. had his trenchcoat taken away
byHenciry andtheyhadmentioned that"Columbine wasstupid"afterHendry hadmentioned
Columbine to them. R0198atp. 168. He testified that his Mom did seem concerned that
Officer Blackwanted to speak to him, but he told her it was okay to wait outside becausehe
trusted Officer Black. R0198 at p. 168. He testified that his Mom did not check on him
while he was being questioned. Id. He testified he did not feel like it was necessary for his
Mom to be present because he figured they were just going to ask him if he knew anyone
who was involved, he did not think that it would be anything like it was. ROl98 at p. 169.
J.B. testified that he did not think C.G. was involved because C.G. never mentioned a school
shooting, and he thought C.G. wanted to borrow the rifle to go rabbit hunting. Id. He
testified that he had been rabbit hunting with L.R.H. before, probably as many as five (5)
times. R0198atpp. 169-170.
A male juvenile student, J.R. testified about an incident that occurred after an
assembly around May 5, 2006, between him and Hendry involving a trenchcoat. ROl98 at
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p. 177. J.R. testified that after the assembly they were handing out ice cream, so he went to
get some and then returned to the auditorium to talk to his friends. Id. At that point, Hendry
approached him and asked him were he kept his things since he did not have a locker, to
which he replied that his things were in his friend J.B.'s Bronco. Hendry then asked him if
he could take the trenchcoat and leave it in Deputy Bradford's office for the day. ROl98 at
pp. 177-178. J.R. testified that he asked Hendry why he could not wear it when he had been
wearing it all year, and Hendry said that he could not wear it because ofwhat had occurred
at Columbine. R0198 at p. 178.
J.R. testified that he went back to where his friends were and told them he could not
wear his trenchcoat at school any more and Hendry had said it was because ofColumbine.
Id. J.R. further testified that, at this point he and his friends discussed Columbine alittle bit.
Id. He testified that L.R.H., J.B., and D.H. were included in the group. Id. He testified that,
after that day, he did not really talk about Columbine, but that it was in his mind. J.R.
testified that he never talked with L.R.H. about aschool shooting. R0198 at p. 179. J.R.
testified that he and L.R.H. would go shooting on the land owned by L.R.H.'s parents
frequently and that they discussed guns when they were shooting. Id. J.R. testified that there
was one incident where he and L.R.H. discussed how many times it had taken to kill arabbit,
since he had shot one that would not die. R0198 at p. 180. J.R. testified that, on May 12,
2006, he was questioned in Deputy's Bradford's office, which he considered an officer's
office, about the school shooting. R0198 at p. 181. J.R. indicated that Deputy Bradford,
Officer Black, and Hendry were present during his questioning, that it lasted about an hour,
and that Officer Black was in uniform. R0198 at p. 182. He testified he was not read his
rights and that they told him that they had witnesses tell them he was going to be involved
in aschool shooting and that ifhe would confess it would be easier for him. Id. He testified
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the doo- was closed during the entire interview and that after he was questioned he was
placed in the principal's office where he remained until the end ofschool. R0198 at p. 183.
J.R. testified that Hendry came inonce and told him that allhisfriends were confessing and
that he should change his mind and confess. Id. He testified that, while he was being
questioned, Officer Black who was in his uniform sat between him and the door. Id. J.R.
stated that he did not feel free to leave the interview because Officer Black was sitting by the
door and they were accusing him telling him they knew he and his friends were going to
perform a school shooting. R0198 at p. 184. J.R. testified that, after school concluded,
his parents arrived and that they all went into Hendry's office, with Deputy Bradford also
present. Id. J.R. testified thatthey discussed hispartinthe situation and that hisfather asked
if he w£s being charged with anything, to which they repliedhe was not. Id. J.R. testified
that his father then ended the interview and they left. Id. J.R. stated that he was scared the
entire time. Id.
J.R. testified that he would go shooting with L.R.H., J.B., and another male juvenile,
J.M., and that they would run through the brush and shoot rabbits and discuss what kind of
shots th^yhad made, wherethe rabbitswere hit, etc. ROl98at p. 185-186. He testified that
he never had a conversation with Hawkins about shooting people with "22's" at Field Day.
ROl98 at p. 186. J.R. said they did talk about shooting "22's" at rabbits quite a bit, and
believed that someone could have overheard them talking about that and misconstrued it.
R0198 at p. 187. J.R. testified that L.R.H. never discussed wanting to commit suicide or
seemed depressed, but that he was mostly upbeat. Id. He testified that he had seen two
poems of L.R.H.'s , one dealing with cannibalism and one with death, and that L.R.H.
occasionally wrote things like that for school assignments and such. Id.
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DanRaisor, ("Dan") whois J.R. 's fathertestified that,on May 12,2006when hisson
was questioned, he received a phone call from Hendry and he and his wife arrived at the
school around 2:00 p.m. to have a discussion with Hendry. R0198 at p. 189. He testified
that, when they arrived at the school, they were sent to Hendry's office and introduced to
Deputy Bradford and Johnson. Id. Then J.R. was retrieved, and he was visibly shaking when
he came in the office and had a hard time speaking. Id. He testified that Hendry told them
what was going on and how he believed J.R. was involved in a possible school shooting
along with L.R.H., another male juvenile student B.H., and J.B.. R0198atp. 189-190. Dan
testified that he was surprised because all four (4) ofthose boys were eagle scouts. R0198
at p. 190. Dan then testified that heasked if there were going tobeany charges filed against
his son, and was told there would not be, so he and his wife took their son home. Id. Dan
testified he recalled the incident regarding J.R.'s trenchcoat andthe J.R. had complied with
Hendry's wishes and that he had worn that trenchcoat to school for several years. R0198 at
p. 191. He testified that he felt like the police were releasing J.R. to him when Deputy
Bradford told him and his wife they could take their son home. Id.
Amale juvenile student B.H. testified that he was questioned by the police about the
school shooting, but that he did not give them a written statement. ROl98 at p. 192. He
testified that C.G. and J.M. had asked him if he was going to be at Field Day, and when he
told them he would not be, they said they were glad because they did not want him to be
there. Id. B.H. testified thatC.G. and J.M. hadbeen asking around if anyone had rifles they
could borrow. R0198atp. 193. B.H. testified he had only heard about them asking, he had
not actually heard it from them. Id. He testified that he had never heard J.M. or C.G. asking
to borrow L.R.H.'s gun. Id.
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Et.H. did testify that L.R.H. had one time grabbed him by the neck and choked him
until he almost passed out. ROl98 at p. 195. B.H. testified that his Dad was the only one
who was supposed to know that, and that his father must have told Officer Black. Id. B.H.
testified thatL.R.H. hadtakenhimto the ground, wrestling, liketheyoftendoandhethought
he was close to passing out. R0198atp. 195. He testified thatoneof his other friends who
were present had to pull L.R.H. offof him. Id. He did testify that hehad a closed knife in
his hand at the time and that he is L.R.H.'s cousin5. ROl 98 at p. 199. B.H. testified that he
had beeti rabbit hunting with L.R.H. and that he was not concerned for his safety or afraid
to leave when it was just him and L.R.H.. R0198 at p. 196. He testified that when others
were present they were jumping around firing rounds at rabbits and such. Id. He testified
that when C.G. and J.M. first told him they were glad he was not coming to Field Day they
told him it could get a little bloody and that concerned him so he went and told Hendry.
R0198atp. 198.
A male juvenile student, D.H. testified that he had been questioned by police about
a plan f >r a school shooting. R0198 at p. 200. He testified he was questioned on May 15,
2006, in Deputy Bradford's office. RO 198 at p. 201. He testified that Officer Black was also
present, but in plain clothes and that Deputy Bradford was in uniform. Id. He testified that
Officer Black was between him and the door and that the door was shut. Id. He testified the
whole cuestioning took about forty-five (45) minutes. Id. Hurst testified that he was not
accused ofanything he was just asked what he knew. R0198atp.202. He testified that they
asked to search his locker and bag and he told them they could and that all they seemed
interested in was some art things he had. Id. He testified he thought it was reasonable for
5 For clarification purposes only, B.H. also carries the same last name as L.R.H., and the
two are rirst cousins. Their fathers are brothers.
30
the police to take rumors ofa school shooting seriously and that their questioning ofhim was
not unreasonable. Id. He testified that him and L.R.H. had discussed bringing water guns
to school for Field Day and who they were going to hang out with because they do it every
year. R0198 at pp.202-203.
L.R.H. testified that he never made any statements to other students about a school shooting,
but that shooting was discussed quite often while rabbit hunting and it was possible that
someone had overheard that and misconstrued it. ROl98 at p. 213. He testified that he and
his friends did discuss bringing water guns to Field Day in shop class. Id. He testified that
he did discuss havinga shootoutwith D.H. and that C.S. and C.L. had asked them what they
were talking about, but it was with water guns and he assumed they knew he was talking
about water guns. R0198 at p. 214. L.R.H. testified he had told Officer Black about an
incident in the sixth (6th) grade where he thought about getting back at some kids he kept
fighting with, buthe never intended to nordidhe act on it andhejust forgot about it. R0198
at pp. 215-216. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court in this matter violated Ut. R. Crtm. P. 12(e) which states that, "[a]
motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the court for good cause
orders that the ruling bedeferred for later determination. Where factual issues are involved
in determining a motion, the court shall state its findings on the record." The trial court
violated this rule when it simultaneously heard the evidence regarding the Motion to
Suppress and the evidence regarding the elements of the crime.
The trial court also erroneously determined that the interview with law enforcement
was not acustodial interrogation and that L.R.H. was not entitled tohis Miranda rights. The
four factors for determining a custodial interrogation were clearly met. The trial court also
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erred in determining that L.R.H. statements made to law enforcement during the interview
were not admissions, but later used them as such in the ultimate determination of as to the
elements of the charged crime. "An admission. . .is an acknowledgment of some fact or
circumstance from which guilt maybe inferred. Although confessions are also admissions,
they arespecial types ofadmissions because theycontain admissions ofthecriminal actitself
and not mere admissions upon which guilt may be inferred." Id.; see State v. Karumai. 101
Utah 592,601,126P.2d 1047,1052(1942)(recognizing the distinction between confessions
and admissions). State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150, 1162, (Utah,1991).
Insufficient evidence exists in this matter to support the elements ofthe crime. First,
the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to testify as to the majority of the evidence
through continually leading the witnesses. Second, if the statements of L.R.H. during the
interview had been properly suppressed, the trial court would have had no evidence upon
which to establish the alleged intent of the charged crime. Third, L.R.H. was either still in
detention or on house arrest during Field Day and did not therefore pose any threat; however,
the additional law enforcement present at the school on Field Day as well as the interviews
ofothers is evidence that such expenditure ofresources was not based upon L.R.H. but rather
on some other perceived threat.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED UT. R. CR1M. P. 12(E) IN HEARING BOTH
THE EVIDENCE ON THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND THE EVIDENCE ON
THE ELEMENTS SIMULTANEOUSLY.
L T. R. CRIM. P. 12(e) states that, "[a] motion made before trial shall be determined
before trial unless the court for good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later
determination. Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall
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state its findings on the record." In the matter ofU.S. v. Fav, 553 F.2d 1247,1248 (10th Cir.
(Utah) 1977), the trial court had heard evidence and testimony at trial and then excused the
jury to hear the evidence regarding the suppression motion. Our 10th Circuit Court ofAppeals
ruled that the trial court had failed to adhere to the Fed. Rules of Crim. P. 12 when it stated
as follows:
It is apparent that the failure of the trial judge to conform to the rules by
refusing to hear the motions to suppress at the prescribed timefrustrated the
proper trial of these defendants. The rules clearly require, under these
circumstances, since no "good cause" for deferring action was in any way
suggested, that apretrial consideration ofthe motions tosuppress with options
open to the parties to take other action before trial. Rule 12, Fed.R.Crim.P.
Also the rules are intended to permit the parties to go into the trial knowing
what the ruling onthe suppression issues will be unless good cause" dictates
otherwise.See United States v. Smith. 495 F.2d 668 (10th Cir.). The procedure
here followed by the trial judge obviously aborted aproper consideration ofthe
motions to suppress,
(emphasis added). According to Fay and Ut. R. Crim. P. 12(e), absent good cause, all pre
trial motions shall be determined before trial.
No "good cause" existed in the instant matter, nor did the trial court even attempt to
articulate any "good cause" for failing to hear and determine the evidence surrounding the
suppression motion prior to hearing the evidence on the underlying elements. The trial court
only indicated that its intent was to hear all of the evidence and testimony, then make a
bifurcated ruling first as to the motion to suppress, then aruling on whether or not the State
has met its burden on the elements, apparently in an attempt to save time by presentation of
all ofthe evidence and testimony at one time. ROl 98 at p. 6. As argued more particularly
below, the failure to abide by the precepts of Ut. R. Crim. P. 12(e) caused substantial
prejudice to L.R.H., resulting in a violation of his rights.
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By entertaining a late response from the State to L.R.H.'s suppression motion rather
than abiding by the deadlines previously established, the trial court found itself with little
time to conduct the suppression hearing prior to the trial. However, L.R.H. was still entitled
to have such hearing held separate from the trial on the underlying elements of the crime
absent "good cause." In a suppression hearing, a trial court is to narrowly focus its attention
on the details of the constitutional rights of the defendant as it pertains to the issues raised
in a suppression motion. Hearing all of the evidence prior to such determination can cause
an inadequate or inappropriate weighing of the evidence not readily seen in the outcome
since th<; prejudice factor can exist only in the subjective determinations ofthe judge, which
may nol end up so clear-cut in the oral or written findings.
Judge Manley specifically stated that she believed the statements made during
L.R.H.'s interview were not relevant to the underlying elements, evidencing that she may
have felt that information gleaned from the interview itselfwas somewhat harmless. RO 198
at p. 261. This "harmless" idea may have affected her determination as to the denial of the
suppression motion if she felt that the remaining evidence presented more adequately
weighed in support ofthe elements. And the interview would be unnecessary to her ultimate
determination. However, Judge Manley then immediately contradicted herself, without
realizing it, and stated that the statements made by L.R.H. were relevant to the element of
intent, determining that the information shared by L.R.H. in the interview evidenced his
intent to commit the crime. Id. Clearly, hearing the evidence simultaneously somewhat
tainted Tie trial court's ability to properly determine either the suppression motion or the
underlying elements of the charge.
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Asdiscussed inFay,a determination priorto trial is necessary fora defendant andhis
counsel tobeadequately apprized ofhisposition, giventhedetermination onthesuppression
issue, when he goes to the trial on the elements ofthe crime(s) charged. Strategy is severely
affected by the inability to predict the outcome of the suppression hearing, which
determination is held until after an entire case has been presented to the trial court when
procedure such as the instant matter is undertaken. Such an action frustrates a proper trial
and a proper consideration of the suppression issues. The only remedy available toL.R.H.
for such a violation of Ut. R. Crim. P. 12(e) is a reversal of both the conviction and the
suppression motion and remand to correct the egregious error.
II. HAWKINS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BY
FAILURE TO GIVE MIRANDA WARNINGS
A. Miranda is Applicable if the Suspect is In Custody and the Questioning Meets
the Legal Definition of Interrogation.
In Application of Gault. 387 U.S. 1, tn. 96, 87 S.Ct. 1428 (U.S. Ariz 1967), the
United States Supreme Court recognized the extreme caution that should be undertaken as
it pertains to ajuvenile's privilege against self-incrimination, as follows:
...the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in the case
ofjuveniles as itis with respect to adults. We appreciate that special problems
may arise with respect to waiver ofthe privilege by oron behalf ofchildren,
and that there may well be some differences in technique-but not in principle-
-depending upon the age of the child and the presence and competence of
parents. The participation ofcounsel will, ofcourse, assist the police, Juvenile
Courts and appellate tribunals in administering the privilege. If counsel was
not present for some permissible reason when an admission was obtained, the
greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the
sense not only that it was not coerced orsuggested, but also that itwas not the
product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.
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In United States v. Ritchie, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals held that "[t]wo requirements
must be met before Miranda is applicable; the suspect must be in 'custody,' and the
questioning must meet the legal definition of 'interrogation.'" 35 F.3d 1477, 1485 (10th
Cir. 1994); see also U.S. v. Hatten. 68 F.3d 257, 261-62 (8th Cir. 1995). The Utah Court of
Appeals has undertaken ananalysis of the term "interrogation," as it relates toMiranda, as
follows:
Miranda safeguards come intoplaywhenever a personin custody is subjected
to either express questioning or its functional equivalent; that is to say, term
"interrogation" for Miranda purposes refers not only to express questioning,
hut also to any words or actions on the part of the police, other than those
rormally attendant to arrest and custody, that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.
Statev.Riggs. 1999UT App 27l.^f 16.987 P.2d 1281. citingRhodeIsland v. Innis.446 U.S.
291,301-302, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689-1690, 64 L.Ed.2d 297.
/(// individuals have the right against self-incrimination in any type of proceeding
where answers might incriminate them in future criminal prosecutions. State v. Cass 635
N.E.2d 225 (Ind. App. 1994), quoting the U.S.C.A. 5th Amend.; emphasis added).
"Proceeding" is defined as 'an act or step that is part of a larger action' (Black's Law
Dictioniry, Second Pocket Edition, p. 558). In the current case, questioning suspects is
definitely an act or step that is part ofa larger action. The interested parties are trying to find
out how the alleged criminal activity occurred and who, if anyone, intentionally took action
towards it. Moreover, the answers to any ofthe questions being asked ofthe defendant have
the potential to incriminate him in future prosecutions.
(A) CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS REQUIRE MIRANDA.
ITie Utah Supreme Court has indicated as follows:
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Safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as suspect's
freedom of action is curtailed to degree associated with formal arrest; more
specifically, Miranda warnings are required whenever circumstances of
interrogation are such that they exert pressures upon detainee that sufficiently
impair his free exercise ofprivilege against self-incrimination to require that
he be warned of his constitutional rights.
State v. Mirguet, 914 P.2d 1144, (Utah 1996). "Police officers must provide Miranda
warnings prior to subjecting a suspect to a 'custodial interrogation,' which is defined as
'questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after aperson has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived ofhis freedom ofaction in any significant way.'" State v. Levin, 2004
UT App 396,110, 101 P.3d 846, quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct.
1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The Utah Supreme Court has set forth four factors in
determining whether an individual is in custody: (a) the site ofthe interrogation; (b) whether
the investigation focused on the defendant; (c) whether the objective indicia of arrest were
present; and (d) the length and form ofthe investigation. State v. Carner. 664 P.2d 1168,
1171 (Utah 1983).
The Utah Supreme Court has given guidelines for consideration of this issue, as
follows:
An accused must be apprised ofhis Miranda rights if the setting is custodial
or accusatory rather than investigatory. In other words, at the point the
environment becomes custodial oraccusatory, apolice officer's questions must
be prefaced with aMiranda warning. However, for the purpose ofdetermining
whether a crime has been committed, investigation and interview arecritical;
under such circumstances, the warning is not required. Annot, 25 A.L.R.3d
1076 (1969); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d
977 (1964); State v. Carlsen, 480 P.2d 736, (Utah, 1971).
State v. Carner. 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983). In Tavion Citv v. Araeon. the Utah Court of
Appeals defined the term "interrogation" as it pertained to "in custody" determinations, as
follows:
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We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person
in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional
equivalent. That is to say, the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not
cnly toexpress questioning, but also toany words oractions on the part ofthe
police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon
the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This focus
reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect
h custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police
practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the
police. Apractice that the police should know isreasonably likely toevoke an
incriminating response from asuspect thus amounts tointerrogation. But, since
tie police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of
tieir words or actions, the definition ofinterrogation can extend only to words
cr actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
813P.2d 1213,1215(UtahApp. 199l)(emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court
themselves have indicated that, as it pertains to "in custody" situations, the "only relevant
inquiry was how reasonable man [in defendant's position] . . . would have understood
situation." Berkemerv.McCartv. 468 U.S. 420,442,104 S.Ct. 3138,82 L.Ed.2d317 (1984).
These holdings clearly indicate that the primary focus on whether an interrogation has
occurred in an "in custody" situation is on the perception ofthe suspect, and whether he felt
pressuredto the extent that it sufficiently impairedhis free exercise ofprivilege againstself-
incrimination.
In the instant matter, the statements that were made by Hawkins to Officer Black and
Deputy Bradford shouldhavebeensuppressed. Hawkins wasincustody whenhemade these
statements and he had not been Mirandized. Therefore, none of the statements he made
during questioning can be used against him. He was in a room withtwo officers, onewho
was dressed in uniform he felt like he had to have permission to leave the room to use the
restroom and had to come right back, he did not feel free to leave at any time and the
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interview went on for at least four (4) hours at the conclusion of which he was placed into
detention. Therefore, he was in custody.
(B) THE CARNER FACTORS PERTAINING TO "IN CUSTODY" ARE MET
IN THIS MATTER.
Given the aforementioned circumstances, an analysis of the Carner four factors
supports afinding of"incustody" in the instant matter. First, the site ofthe interrogation was
intimidating to L.R.H.. Carner at 1171. L.R.H. was summoned by the Vice Principal in this
matter, Hendry as he was leaving for lunch. ROl98 at p. 205. Hendry then took him to
Deputy Bradford's office, left him there, and closed the door. Id. L.R.H. testified that he
was never offered lunch, but was offered a soda pop or a drink, but not lunch and the
interview occurred at lunchtime. R0198 at p. 206. L.R.H. testified that, although he was
allowed to use the restroom, he felt just like hewas asking a teacher in class ifhe could use
the restroom and that he was expected to immediately return. Id. L.R.H. testified that
Officer Black was in hisuniform and he sat between L.R.H. and the door during the whole
interview. ROl98 at p. 207. He testified that he never felt like he could get up and leave if
he wanted to, that ifhe did they would just pick him up later. Id. L.R.H. testified that there
were times during the questioning that Officer Black and Deputy Bradford would step out
in the hall and he could hear them talking but that he remained in the office. Id. He testified
there was aperiod oftime when he was alone in the office but that Officer Black had told
him he would be right back and so he assumed he should stay, and he said the door to the
office was closed for the majority of the time. Id. L.R.H. testified that there was never a
point were he felt he could just leave. R0198 at p. 208.
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[ is clear thata reasonable person would be intimidated bythe surroundings and feel
that the Jiey could notjust leave the interview, particularly ajuvenile who ispresented with
two police officers when one is uniformed and both exert law enforcement authority in the
community. During the trial on August 18, 2006 it was articulated by the court and the
prosecu orinthis matter thatL.R.H. had a sense of maturity, thatheisbetter than an average
student, that he is very intelligent, and articulate. R0198 at pp. 227, 236. For a juvenile,
L.R.H. epitomizes the "reasonable person" standard for circumstances such asthese. L.R.H.
clearly testified that hefelt intimidated given the surroundings inthe interview, therefore the
first £ajnejr factor has been met. The second Carner factor involves whether the
investigation focused on the defendant. Carner at 1171. As we know from the facts, the
investigation did indeed focus on L.R.H. Although several otherstudents were questioned,
none of them were detained or questioned for nearly the length of time as L.R.H.. L.R.H.
was tolc byofficers during the questioning that several others had told them he was involved
in the c;ise and that he should just confess. ROl98 at p. 222. These facts evidence that the
investigation was definitively focused on L.R.H. The existence of investigation intoother
individualswas simply to determine other alleged co-conspirators, not that they believed only
one individual was involved with the alleged plot. They believed L.R.H. was involved based
upon statements of other individuals and were interrogating him, asking to search his
belongings, and detaining him while they determined what to do with him, all based on that
belief.
ITie third factor of Carner pertains to whether the objective indicia of arrest were
present. Carner at 1171. Typical indicia ofarrest include "readied handcuffs, lockeddoors,
or drawn guns."' Id. Utah courts have also held that, even in the absence of typical indicia
of arres:, an explicit accusation by an officer that an individual has committed a crime may
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be sufficient indicia of arrest to indicate custody. See Statev. Mirguet 844 P.2d 995, 1000
(Utah Ct.App.1992), affd, 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996). In this matter, the "typical" indicia
ofarrest existed. Although this interview was conducted at the school in Deputy' Bradford's
office, the door was closed during the majority ofthe interview and Officer Black was in his
uniform. L.R.H. was also accused by the officers, told that others had implicated him, and
told to confess. This verbage is indicative of an intention on behalf of the officers to elicit
an incriminating response from L.R.H., evidencing that this was an interrogation rather than
just questioning. Riggs at 1116, supra. When this language did not elicit a confession, the
officers continued by probing L.R.H. as to whether he had ever considered doing something
like this, the resulting statements being used as admissions towards the ultimate
determination of his intent in this matter. Although L.R.H. continually told the officers he
had no involvement in aplanned school shooting, he was continually accused by the officers
and did not feel like he could just leave the interview without being picked up later to
continue the interrogation. Because L.R.H. felt like his freedom had been curtailed to an
extent and that he could not simply terminate the interrogation, and because the officers
continuedto accusehim of involvement, it is clear that sufficient indicia of arrest was present
to indicate that he was in custody. See, Mirguet at 1000.
The fourth and final factor of Carner pertains to the length and form of the
investigation. L.R.H. testified that he was in Deputy Bradford's office for approximately
four (4) hours. Although he was not undergoing continuous questioning during the
interrogation, he was still detained for the at least four (4) hours time. L.R.H. testified that,
even when the officers left they indicated that they would be right back, and on at least one
occasion they simply stepped outside the door and remained outside the door discussing the
matters and what should be done with L.R.H. As argued supra, the interrogation was
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accusatory rather than investigative, requiring Miranda warnings to be given. Carner at
1171. Ihis matter clearly meets the four factor criteria ofCarner to indicate that L.R.H.was
in custody and subjected to custodial interrogation to attempt to elicit his confession to the
alleged 2rime.
L.R.H. was unaware ofhis rights and the circumstances dictated that he should have
been advised of his Miranda rights, at a minimum, prior to asking for a confession based
upon the implicationofhim in the crime by other alleged witnesseswhom he knewthey had
also questioned or interrogated. Since both Deputy Bradford and Officer Black failed to
advise L.R.H. of his Miranda warnings, the evidence obtained surrounding his statements
should 3e suppressed in support of protecting his Fifth Amendment rights against self-
incrimination. Because his statements were obtained in violation of Miranda, any
information obtained during the interview should have been suppressed in favor ofprotecting
L.R.H.' >constitutional rights. The trial court clearly erred indenying the suppression motion
based 0:7 its erroneous conclusion that L.R.H. was not subjected to custodial interrogation
and sue i denial should be overturned.
B. The Trial Court Improperly Determined the Weight of Evidence to Be Given to
the Statements from the Interview Either in the Denial of the Suppression
Motion or in the Ruling on the Elements.
"An admission. . .is an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance from which
guilt may be inferred. Although confessions are also admissions, they are special types of
admissions because they contain admissions of the criminal act itself and not mere
admissi 3ns upon which guilt may be inferred." Id.; see State v. Karumai. 101 Utah 592,601,
126 P.2d 1047, 1052 (1942)(recognizing the distinction between confessions and
admissi 3ns). State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1162, (Utah, 1991). "A confession is the
admission of guilt by the defendant of all the necessary elements of the crime of which he
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is charged, including the necessary acts and intent. An admission merely admits some fact
which connects or tends to connect the defendant with the offense but not with all the
elements ofthe crime." State v. Masato Karumai. 101 Utah 592,126 P.2d 1047, 1052, (Utah,
1942). citing State v. Johnson. 95 Utah 572, 83 P.2d 1010: People v. Fowler. 178 Cal. 657,
174 P. 892; State v. Carroll. 52 Wyo. 29, 69 P.2d 542. State v. Stevens. 60 Mont. 390, 199
P. 256.
The court in this matter erred in the denial of the Motion to Suppress Hawkins'
statements. The Court acknowledged that nothing Hawkins' had said during the interview
with the police was relevant tothe underlying charge. R0198 at pp. 238-247. However, the
trial court then used the very same statements that L.R.H. gave to the police during the
interview to evidence the element of intent. The court erred in not suppressing these
statements because Hawkins' constitutional rights were violated by not being read his
Miranda rights during the interview. As is argued supra, Hawkins was in custody when he
was interviewed. However, his constitutional rights were violated and the statements made
in the interview were harmful because he was not given his Miranda rights and those
statements were then used against him as admissions to establish intent, even though the trial
court had indicated that the very same statements were not relevant to the elements ofthe
crime. The court either erred in finding that the statements made by L.R.H. during the
interview were not relevant to the elements and was improperly influenced by presentation
of all of the evidence in the trial court's denial of the suppression motion as argued supra,
or erred in using the statements as admissions to determine the element ofintent although
obtained during acustodial interrogation in violation ofMiranda. In essence, the trial court's
contradictory finding that the statements were irrelevant to the elements, but relevant to the
intent-which is an element-create an error either in a violation ofUt.R. Crim. P. 12(e) and
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the improperweighing of evidence, or determination as to the custodial interrogation issue
onthe suppression motion. Either way, the denial of the suppression motion clearly cannot
stand.
HI. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
CONVICTION
A. The Trial Court Erred in Allowing the Prosecutor to Lead the Witnesses
Throughout the Trial.
UT.R. Evid. 611(a) states that, u[t]he court shall exercise reasonable control over the
mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainmentofthe truth, (2) avoidneedless
consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment."
UT. R. EVID. 611(c) states that, "[l]eading questions should not be used on the direct
examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness' testimony."
"A trial court has discretion in permitting leading questions on direct
examination "as may be required to develop [the witness's] testimony." Utah
R.Evid. 611(c). Leading questions may be necessary to develop the testimony
cfa child, especially one who is testifying about a sensitive and embarrassing
subject. State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah 1989). Nevertheless,
hading questions can be used, both inadvertently and intentionally, to shape
and create evidence that conforms to the interrogator's version ofthe facts. For
t iat reason, it is essential that trial judges exercise tight control over the use of
Lading questions in cases such as this to assure that they are used only after
riore open-ended questions have failed to produce responses. Highly
suggestive questions thatcall onlyfor "yes"or "no "answers should be used
only when less suggestive questions are ofno avail. "
State v. Kallim 877 P.2d 138, 144 (Utah 1994)(Emphasis added).
In State v. Villarreal. 889 P.2d 419,423 (Utah, 1995), the State called Blake Bedient
to testify. Bedient was currently an inmate in the Utah State Prison where he was serving a
sentence after he had been convicted of previously assaulting the victim in that matter.
However, once on the stand Bedient refused to testify. The prosecutor then asked Bedient
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several leading questions, in attempt to elicit testimony. In its decision, the Utah Supreme
Court ruled that, "[w]henBedientrefused to answertheprosecutor's questions, eventhough
the refusal waswithout legal justification, the prosecutor was not entitled to present to the
jury what he thought Bedient should have testified to, especially knowing he would not
answer." Villarreal at 423.
The prosecutor was not a witness, was not sworn, and was not subject to cross-
examination as to the truthfulness of his recounting Bedient's statements.
Similarly, although Bedient was sworn, it was impossible for Villarreal to
cross-examine him as to the truthftilness of the statements. The factual
propositions assertedinthe prosecution'sleadingquestionsmayverywellhave
been considered truthful statements, given Bedient's nonresponsiveness.
/^./see Douglas v. Alabama. 380U.S.415, 416-17,85 S.Ct. 1074, 1075-76, 13L.Ed.2d934
(1965); cf. Slochowerv. BoardofHigherEduc. 350U.S. 551,557-58, 76S.Ct. 637,640-41,
100 L.Ed. 692 (1956). TheUtah Supreme Court determined that, "[bjecause Villarreal had
no way to cross-examine the truthfulness of the statements, he was denied his right of
confrontation under our state and federal constitutions."
Inthe instant matter, the prosecutor examined five ofhis six witnesses through the use
of leading questions. The trial court asked the prosecutor not to testify in his examination
of thethird witness andsustained a formal objection byL.R.H.'s counsel onhisexamination
of the fifth witness. R1098 at pp. 76 and 98. By this time, however, the majority of the
prosecutor's case-in-chief had already been presented through leading questions.
The trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to continually ask the witnesses
leading questions. In essence, the trial court allowed the prosecutor to testify and gathered
information and evidence from that testimony and used this information to convict L.R.H.
of the crime. As is stated in Ut. R. Evid. 611(a) the court should exercise "reasonable
control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses." Although the trial court did
45
admonish the prosecutor for leading the witnesses, he continued to do so. RO 198 at pp. 76
and 98. The court did not make further attempts to curtail his leading questioning, even in
light of the fact that four (4) of his six (6) witnesses were juveniles at the time of the trial.
As stated above, although the trial court has discretion over the use of leading
questioning, highly suggestive questioning shouldonly be used when other less suggestive
methods, of questioning are of no avail. The witnesses in this matter were capable of
renderirg the testimony themselves, and there was neither indication otherwise nor
determination by the trial court that leading was appropriate. The prosecutor in this matter
mainly used highly suggestive leading questions eliciting "yes" and "no" responses, and
failed to utilize other methods of questioning that would not be as suggestive. As one
example, he continually asked witnesses ifthe rumors they had heard made them worried or
concern ;d instead ofasking them to describe in tfieir own words how they felt. RO 198 at pp.
145, 14''. This alleged "fear" factor goes directly to an element of the crime charge in this
matter and is highly prejudicial. The trial court erred in failing to curtail the prosecutor's
leading line of questioning earlier, and by not continuing to do so when the prosecutor
continued to use leading questioning. Because of the prosecutor's continual and highly
suggestive leading questioning, there is insufficient evidence actually elicited in this matter
from the witnesses rather than the prosecutor to support the conviction. Much of the
testimony that was given in this matter was the result ofthe prosecutor leading the witnesses.
By allowing this line ofquestioning to continue, L.R.H.'s rights under U.S. Const. Amend
VI and Utah Const. Art. I §7 and 12 were violated. Villarreal.
In the instant matter, L.R.H. was denied his right to confront the witnesses because,
in allowing the prosecutor to use leading questions, the prosecutor was the one who was
46
testifying and not the witnesses. Because L.R.H. had the right to confront any evidence
presented by the witnesses, hewas denied this right because the evidence presented was not
given by the witnesses but the prosecutor himself. The prosecutor had not been sworn to
testify nor could L.R.H. cross-examine him as to the truthfulness of the witnesses'
statements. Villarreal. Clearly the highly suggestive questioning was relied upon in the trial
court's findings in a determination as to the credibility ofthe witnesses. Although several
alternative hypotheses were presented by the defense counsel's witnesses as to L.R.H.'s
involvement, the trial court found the evidence elicited by the prosecution more credible by
finding in favor ofthe prosecution. The trial court's failure to uphold the Rules ofEvidence
in this matter by failing to comply with UT. R. Evid. 611(a) and (c) necessarily caused a
violation ofL.R.H.'s rights under U.S. Const.Amend VI and Utah Const.Art. I §7 and
12.
B. No Intent Can Be Proven If the Motion to Suppress is Granted.
A terroristic threat is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107 as follows:
(1) Aperson commits aterroristic threat ifhe threatens to commit any offense
involving bodily injury, death, or substantial property damage, and:
(a) he threatens the use ofaweapon ofmass destruction, as defined in Section
76-10-401, orthreatens by the use ofa hoax weapon ofmass destruction, as
defined in Section 76-10-401; or
(b) he acts with intent to:(i) intimidate or coerce a civilian population or to influence or affect the
conduct of a government or a unit of government;(ii) cause action ofany nature by an official or volunteer agency organized to
deal with emergencies;(iii) place aperson in fear ofimminent serious bodily injury, substantial bodily
injury, or death; or(iv) prevent or interrupt the occupation of a building or a portion of the
building, a place to which the public has access, or a facility or vehicle of
public transportation operated by a common carrier.
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Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103 defines the element of "intent" by stating that, "[a] person
engages in conduct: (1) Intentionally, orwith intent orwillfully with respect tothe nature of
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to
engage n the conduct or cause the result."
The trial court in this matter specifically stated as follows inthe determination of the
underlying elements of the case:
.. .And thenalthough I donotbelieve thatIhestatements youmade during, ah,
questioning are relevant to support theseelements, they do- they arerelevant
to give us some insight to what you intent was.
Was you intent water guns? Was you intent, ah, justa Field Day free-for-
all? Was; it important for you to have a large groupofpeople? Whatwas the
weight of that statement?
And the Officer indicated, ah, that you stated, urn - (Inaudible) - to him;
tiat you thought about this a lot; that you had two different plans. One was
Field Day. The other was an assembly, again corroborating the fact that you
would like to have a large group of people present.
Thatwhenyou go rabbit hunting, you talk about Columbine and you think
how easy it would be to bring guns to school. You think it would be wrong
hecause youwouldbe killingyour friends. The nextmorning you thinkabout
ii; again. You think about how Columbine went wrong because they could
have shot more people.
He asked how - asked how it would play out, how it would happen. Ah,
so you could take over the office and the intercom system. Go classroom to
classroom were your second idea. To take over an assembly and get more
people into one room.
Ah, you say you didn't make those statements, and again where the
testimony is conflict - in conflict, I don't find that to be credible. Ah, this
cirectly ties in to the rumor, directly ties in to the statements that the boys
r eard in shop, and, ah, not as directly, but peripherally ties in to the statement
ty the young lady.
And what's the effect of that? Well, what is coercion? What is
iitimidation? Intimidation is to place fear. That's what intimidation means.
Um, some ofthese people - you know, to say that these kids didn't take this
seriously, I think that they heard the statementand they thought he wasjoking,
and then they continued to talk about it. "Do you think it will really happen?"
Ah, and then there was some discussion as it spread, and it spread based on
>ourword. "I'm not goin' on Field Day. Well, I'm gonna go to Field Day."
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And it rose to thepoint where, as it traveled through the town, it made itsway
to the school officials and law enforcement, and this was the result.
And so as I've listened to the arguments and processed through that, I can
find beyond areasonable doubt that you committed a terroristic threat and that
you threatened to commit any offense involving bodily injury, death or
substantial property. One can infer reasonably that tobring guns toschool and
have a shootout with a large group of people is a threat of bodily injury or
death and that you did that with the intent to intimidate, to place fear in or
coerce, which is to cause somebody to act.
R0198 at pp. 261-263. As argued supra, the element of"intent" in this matter was gleaned
primarily from the information elicited by the officers in the custodial interrogation to which
L.R.H. was subjected. Should this Court determine that the denial ofthe suppression motion
should be overturned, and that L.R.H.'s statements in his interview with law enforcement
should be suppressed, then no evidence would exist from which any form ofintent can be
proven in this matter. Hence, should this Court determine that L.R.H.'s statements should
have been suppressed, an overturn ofthe underlying conviction is necessary for lack ofproof
as to the element of intent.
C. Law Enforcement Action Cannot be Attributable to L.R.H.
While there isinsufficient evidence toshow that L.R.H. possessed the necessary intent
to meet the elements ofthe crime, there is also sufficient evidence to show that many others
were questioned or had knowledge ofthis matter. Evidence shows that search warrants were
effectuated on the residences of J.M. and C.G., but not L.R.H.. Several other students were
questioned or interrogated with respect to their involvement in the rumors surrounding such
aplan and were also accused by officers and told to confess. Every other student that was
interviewed in this matter was released to their parents and, upon information and belief, no
other charges were filed. L.R.H. was the only one charged, placed into detention, and not
released to his parent or guardian.
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The evidence pertaining to subsequent lav/ enforcement action taken with respect to
assemblies and Field Day cannot be attributable to L.R.H. After L.R.H.'s placement in
detention, school officials and the community were still worried about the safety of the
students The Sheriffs Department and the Blanding Police Department supplied more
manpower on Field Day even though L.R.H. remained in detention until May 30, 2006, and
was then placed directly on house arrest. When Field Day arrived, L.R.H. presented no threat
ofany kind tothe community, but officials must have fell: that a threat still existed from their
interview of the other juveniles to justify their request for more law enforcement.
The forty (40) hours of law enforcement manpower testified as used subsequent to
L.R.H/ splacement indetention to was used by the trial court tomeet the element that L.R.H.
". . xause[d] action of any nature by an official or volunteer agency organized to deal with
emergencies..." Utah CodeAnn. §76-5-107(1 )(b)(ii). However, if a threat existed at that
time to meet the element, it was not attributable to L.R.H. since he was in detention and then
on house arrest.
There is insufficient evidence to actually meet the elements ofthe crime in the instant
matter. The evidence presented was done so in violation of the Rules of Evidence and
L.R.H/;. constitutional rights to confrontation through the leading of witnesses and such
evidence cannot supportofthe elements in this matter. Additionally, the suppression of the
evidence was required since the interview was volativc of L.R.H.'s Miranda rights and his
Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination, necessarily causing a failure in the
evidence to meet the burden of proof as to intent in this matter. Additionally, because
officials still thought a threat existed at the time L.R.H. was either in detention or on house
arrest, there is insufficient evidence to support that any actions by L.R.H. met the element
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ofthecrime requiring a finding thathe caused any action of any nature by law enforcement
officials in this matter as it pertained to assemblies or Field Day.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED HAWKINS' CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS BY FINDING HIM GUILTY BELOW THE STANDARD OF
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
The United States Supreme Court applied the proof beyond a reasonable doubt
standard tojuvenile court cases nearly forty (40) years ago in In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358,
368, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). However, a year later in McKeiver v.
Pennsvlvania. 403 U.S. 528, 545-51, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971), it refused to
extend the constitutional right to a trial by jury to the same.
In the case of State v. Reyes, the Utah Supreme Court undertook an analysis of
reasonable doubt jury instructions and, in the process, articulated the standard of"beyond a
reasonable doubt" as follows:
No person accused in the United States may be convicted of a crime unless
each element ofthe offense has beenprovenbeyond a reasonable doubt. In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The
Supreme Court has assigned this standard of proof constitutional status,
linking it to both the Fifth Amendment right to due process of law and the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,
278, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993): Winship. 397 U.S. at 362, 364,
90 S.Ct. 1068. The degree ofcertainty ofguilt that we insist be held by those
entrusted with judging the fate ofpersons charged with crimes before we will
permit the State to wield its power to punish is not only ameasure ofevidence,
butalso ina more fundamental sense a gauge of ournation's conscience. The
measure ofcertainty the law demands before finding guilt reflects the balance
we are willing to strike between ensuring that all ofthe guilty are brought to
justice and preventing the conviction and punishment of the innocent.
Blackstone set an enduring benchmark for the measure of certainty required
to convict in a civilized society when he stated that "the law holds that it is
better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer." 4William
Blackstone, Commentaries, quoted in Coffin v. United States. 156 U.S. 432,
456, 15 S.Ct. 394, 39 L.Ed. 481 (1895).
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Ibid., 2005 UT 33, \\ 1, 116 P.3d 305. In Reyes., the Utah Supreme Court's determination
that the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt" within ajury instruction causes asubstantial
risk that ajuror could find adefendant guilty ofbelow the constitutional standard of"beyond
areasonable doubt." During its analysis, theUtaflSupreme Court determined that the atwo-
step undertaking of(a) identification ofadoubt and (b) an attempt to let the State "obviate"
or "eliminate" such doubt created the substantial risk, finding that any phrase creating this
risk was thus constitutionally unsound. Id. at1ff[24-30.
1he Utah Supreme Court determined that the identification ofadoubt followed by an
assessment by the finder of fact as to whether the evidence overcame such a doubt, "is
precisely the circumstance in which the rhetoric ofthe law, particularly the presumption of
innocen :eand thestate burden ofproof, require acquittal." Id. at128, citing Steve Sheppard,
'Hie Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of Proof Have
Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1165, 1213 (2003).
Although not pertaining toa reasonable doubt jury instruction due tothe McKeiver holding
that juvenile cases maintain no right toajury trial, the same type oftwo-step undertaking was
performed by the trial court in this matter during theprosecutor's closing arguments.
During theprosecutor's closing statements intheinstant matter, astheprosecutor was
arguing the elements of the crime charged, the trial court interrupted and questioned the
prosecutor as follows:
Well, and let me stop you there, cause this is I think that the best argument is
tiat he intended to - intended to intimidate a civilian population. I think that
>ou ahve to - forprong two, youhaveto show thathis intent was to cause an
action by an official, ah, or volunteer agency organized to deal with
emergencies; that when he said this, his intent was to really, ah, law
enforcementand other people. But the time that I think that you have a break
is that - that - that it seems to me - and I - and I want to hear what you have
to say about this - that the response by these agencies to Field Day and, ah,
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putting in more support in place, really - and I 'm notentirelyconvincedofthis,
so I want to hear what you have to say. But really came as a result of the
interview with him, lookingin his backpack, hearing what he had to say about
"I think about this all of the time", ah, and that that - that wasn't public
information. So that wasn't something that was - that was. ah, put out there
in a way that other people would respond to it. It came as a result of that
questioning. And they responded, and I think they responded appropriately.
Ah, but do you see what I'm saying, with regard to that?
R0198 at pp. 249-250 (emphasis added). While Reyes determined that an unarticulated or
undefined doubtwas sufficient to acquit and thuscould not be subjectedto the State's efforts
toovercome it, inthe instant matter we clearly have a moreapparent articulated doubt by the
trialcourt as to one ofthe elements ofthe crime charged. During the prosecutor's testimony,
the trial courtspecifically informed the parties that shewas not convinced that the words or
actions undertaken by Hawkins priorto his interview were sufficient for thepublic reaction
in sending several officers to Field Day for safety purposes. The trial court specifically
requested that the prosecutor attempt to overcome her doubts in this regard in his closing
arguments.
Such actions, the identification of a doubt and then requesting the prosecutor to
overcome them, are precisely the circumstance in which the presumption of innocence and
the state burden ofproof, require acquittal. See, Reyes at 1128. All ofthe evidence had been
presented when the trial court articulated its doubt. The only remaining statements were
closing arguments, during which the trial court interrupted and specifically articulated her
doubt, requesting further argument to "convince" her. Such an undertaking is aviolation of
Hawkins' Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to be convicted only upon a finding of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. U.S. Const., Amends. V and VI. The trial court identified a
doubt respecting an element ofthe crime and, as such, should have found Ilawkins not guilty
and acquitted him in upholding the very standard upon which our judicial system rests.
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CONCLUSION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, L.R.H. respectfully requests that this Court
reverse tie denial of the suppression motion in this matter and the First Order and Second
Order, and enter other such orders as this Court deems appropriate.
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Addendum ~A~
Minutes, Findings, and Order
dated August 23, 2006
Seventh District Juvenile Court
FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UlTAH
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of
Hawkins, Lawrence Ray 10-10-1989
A person under the age of 18 years
Minutes, Findings, and Order
Case No. 509817
BeforeJudge Mary L. Manley on August 18, 2006
This case came before the Court for a hearing on the following:
Case Number 509817, Lawrence Hawkins
2 - OTHER ACTS - PUBLIC ORDER (Felony - 2nd Degree) - Trial
MINUTES:
Present:
Lawrence Ray Hawkins; Craig C. Halls, Attorney; Edwin B. Hawkins, Father, Joyce G. Smith, Attorney;
Thomas Lee Moore, Probation Officer, Troy Butler, Bailiff; Arthur Adair, Probation; Tammy Barton and
Tamara Lyman, San Juan School District, Barbara Hawkins, Edwin Hawkins, Stan Hurst, Kay Jones; Jermiah
Moon, Brandon Shumway, LynetteShumway, JackieMoses and JamieHoliday
Petition(s) is/are read.
Mrs. Smith addresses the court and motionsto exclude witnesses duringthe pretrial motionsand the trial. She
also asksthat Lawrence be allowed to testify. Mr. Halls stipulates. The court grants the same.
Mr. Halls states his witness list
Mrs. Smith states her witness list
9:17 Cal Dean Black called, sworn, examined by Mr. Halls and cross-examined by Mrs. Smith. Redirect is
made by ATP. The court questions the witness.
10:42 Briona Holiday called, sworn and examined by Mr. Halls. The court informs the parties as tc her
intentions for the proceedings ofthe motion to suppress hearing, as weU as the trial. The hearings wil be
combined with abifurcated ruling. Mrs. Smith cross<xarnines the witness and ATP redirects. The court
questions the witness. ATD requests that she call arebuttal witness at this time. The court states that she may do
so after the state presents ifs case.
Continued on next ptge
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10:53 Christopher Sanchez called, sworn, examined byMr. Halls and cross-examination by ATD. ILedirect is
made by Mr. Halls.
11 ;05 ATD offers exhibit #5, there is no objection, exhibit #5 is entered. Upon cross examination, it is
discovered thatexhibit #5, a witnessstatement, was only a partial statementand that there is a compauonpage
which ATD did not receive prior totoday's date. Mr. Halls reoffers exhibit #5 initsentirety and ATP objects.
ATD moves towithdraw exhibit #5. Thecourtgrants the samethemotion to withdraw exhibit #5 as offered by
ATD. The motion byMr. Halls to enter Exhibit #5 is denied as it was notfully provided in discovery.
11:08 Cody Laws called, sworn, examined byATP, cross-examined by Mrs. Smith. Redirect is mace byMr.
Halls.
11:19 JustinMatthews called, sworn, examined by Mr. Halls and a^ss-examination by ATD. Rediiect
examination by ATP.
11:35 Kelly Bradford iscalled byMr. Halls. Mrs. Smith objects because thewitness was not onthe witness
list ATP states his reasoning forthewitness to testify. The court denies the testifying of thewitness.
11:36 Russell Hendry called, sworn and examined byMr. Halls. Cross-examination is made byMn, Smith
and redirect by ATP. The court questions the witness.
12:11 Steven White called, sworn, examined byATD andcross-examined by Mr. Halls. The court questions
the witness.
1.35 Court is backin session. MichaelFlavelcalled, sworn, examined by Mrs. Smithand cross-examined by
Mr. Halls. The court questions the witness.
1:40 Cody Hatcher called, sworn and examined byATD. Cross-examination byMr. Halls.
1:47 Rachel Hatcher called, sworn, examined byMrs. Smith andcross-examined by ATP.
1:53 Jule Hawkins called, sworn and examined by Mrs. Smith. Mr. Halls cross-examines the witness.
2:01 Justin Blackcalled, sworn,examined by ATD and cross-examination by Mr. Halls.
2:09 Shiela Black called, sworn and examined by Mrs. Smith.
2:16 Jonathan Raisor called, sworn, examined by ATD and cross-examined by Mr. Halls.
Contnued as om page
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2:31 Dan Raiser called, sworn and examined by Mrs. Smith.
2:36 Blain Hawkins called, sworn, examined by ATD and cross-examination by Mr. Halls. The court
questions the witness. Redirect by Mrs. Smith and recross by ATP.
2:46 Dustin Hurst called, sworn and examined by Mrs. Smith.
2:51 LawrenceHawkins called, sworn, examined by ATD and cross-examined by Mr. Halls. Redirect
examination by Mrs. Smith and recross by ATP.
3:34 Court is back in session. The court advises counsel ofwhat the closing arguments should focuii on. Mrs.
Smith presents herclosing arugments as to the suppression hearing. Mr. Hallsresponds. ATD respond. The
court states its ruling regarding the suppression hearing.
4:25 Thecourt states its' ruling. Mr. Hallsgives his recommendation. Mrs. Smithrequests the the dsfendant
be able to remain on house arrest while waiting placement in O&A. The request is denied.
Exhibits:
EXHIBIT Number 001 (Poem) was submitted by State andwas received, reviewed, and accepted into evidence.
EXHIBIT Number 002 (Drawing) wassubmitted by State andwas received, reviewed, andaccepted nto
evidence.
EXHIBIT Number 003 (Drawing) was submitted by State andwas received, reviewed, and accepted into
evidence.
EXHIBIT Number 004 (Witness Statement) was submitted by Defendant and was received, reviewec, and
accepted into evidence.
EXHIBIT Number 005 (Witness Statement) was submitted byDefendant and was received, reviewec., and not
accepted into evidence. Withdrawn.
EXHIBIT Number 006 (Witness Statement) was submitted by State and was received, reviewed, and accepted
into evidence.
EXHIBIT Number 007 (Witness Statement) was submitted by Defendant and was received, reviewec, and
accepted into evidence.
FINDINGS:
Based upon the evidence presented attrial, the Court finds that the State has met its burden ofproof k«eyond a
reasonable doubt astoallegations) 2 - OTHER ACTS - PUBLIC ORDER and theminor comes withinthe
provisions of the Utah Juvenile Court Act
Continued on next ptge
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Youth wasnot ithe sole focus ofthe police investigation. The investigation focused on several youth, including
two for whom search warrants were approved. The questioning at the school took place with severa youth in
anattempt o sortout fact fromrumor. The site of the questioning was at the school in a room similar to other
rooms. The questioning took place by a street domed resource officer employed by the police depaitment, a
uniformed officer and the vice-principal. While the students knew the officers were law enforcement they refer
to them on a first name basis and appear to have a casual relationship with them. The questioning wis not
aggressive, loud, coercive nor was mere any other indicia of inappropriate questioning that took place. The
youth consented to a search ofhis pack within a halfhour of the interview. The youth was in the resource
office room from approximately 11:30 to 4:00. During school hours (11:30 to 1:00), the office was closed in an
effort to reduce hall noise and for privacy. Thereafter, the door was open. The youth was free to go to the
bathroom unaccompanied, he was left alone periodically, and he was offered the opportunity to go tc lunch
unattended on three separate occasions. The focus of the questioning was twofold, one to sort out possible safe
school violations and two, to determine potential law violations. The youth's emergency contact person was
notified of the questioning and provided the school with a phone number for his parents to contact w ien
questioning was completed. The parents were aware that the questioning was taking place, but never contacted
the school to intervene or speak with officials concerning the questioning. The youth was not in custody and
Miranda was inapplicable as further outlined in the court's oral findings.
The youth's statements at school regarding the shooting were intended to intimate a civil public (the school
citizenry) of fear ofsubstantial bodily death or injury. The intended affect was accomplished as evidenced by
the students, parents and school official's response to the statements.
Where the testimony differs, the youth is found to be less credible.
ORDERS:
The Motion to Suppress is denied as outlined above and as outlined in the court's oral findings.
The youth is guilty of the offense as charged in the Petition.
Lawrence Ray Hawkins is committed to detention for a period of 30 days to commence immediately. Minoris
to be held pending placement in 0&A.
The custody of Lawrence RayHawkins is placed withthe Division of Juvenile Justice Services fora period not
to exceed 45days forobservation and assessment Theminor's removal from the home andplacement with the
Division ofJuvenile Justice Services is in the best interest of the minor. The parents) are ordered to contact the
Office of Recovery Services (ORS)to determine a supportamountfor the minor for the period that tie custody
of the minoris givento an agency or support is assigned to the State ofUtah in accordance with U.C.A. 62-A-l-
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117 and 78-45-4.4. In the absence ofa prior order you are required to contactORS to determine your
obligation, and if you fail to do so within 30 days, your liability shall accrue as ofthe date ofthis hearing. ORS
shall be responsible forcollecting the child supportand disbursing it to the appropriate agency or individual.
The courthas advised the parentis) ofthe above information regarding a child support obligation. The
parent(s) shall contact ORS Team 70, 515 East 100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 or call (801) 536-8770 or
(888) 734-3955 within 30 days. Review and further disposition is set for October 17, 2006.
A Review - O & A hearing is set for 10-17-2006 at 10:15 AM.
Failure to comply with the above order may result in your being found in contempt of court, the loss of your
driver license, and/or forfeiture ofany or all of your Utah State Income Tax Refund.
Copy of this court order is your personal notice to appear for the above hearing. You will not receive further
notice.
You have a right to appeal this matter to the Utah State Court ofAppeals. Appeals must be filed witiin 30 days





Mary L. Manley, Judge
Recorded by S. Atcitty
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